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Abstract
We analyze a simple oligopoly model where rms can engage in cost-
reducing R&D. We compare two R&D regimes: R&D competition and
R&D cooperation where rms can enter in a Research Joint Venture
(RJV). We introduce coordination costs for the RJV and examine how
these a¤ect the equilibrium outcomes. Further, we examine the ques-
tion of the equilibrium versus optimal size of the RJV. For a given size
of the RJV, its members decrease their own R&D as the anticipated
coordination costs increase. This results in lower output and prots.
On the contrary, the non-RJV rms increase their R&D investments
in response to the fall in the RJV rmsR&D.We show that the per-
formance of the RJV in terms of R&D investment, prot and welfare
in relation to R&D competition is sensitive to the level of coordination
costs. Furthermore, we show that, although the RJV as a whole may
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no longer conduct a unit of R&D at a lower cost compared to the in-
dependent rm under the non-cooperative R&D regime, its members
can still make savings on their own R&D expense through information
sharing. Finally, we nd that not only the equilibrium size becomes
smaller as coordination costs increase, but the discrepancy between
the equilibrium and optimal sizes is widening. One important message
from our analysis is that by ignoring the coordination costs of oper-
ating the RJV, the anticipated benets or success of the cooperative
project could have been grossly exaggerated.
Keywords: research joint venture, coordination costs, equilibrium
size, optimal size
JEL Class. No.: O30, L13, D43
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1 Introduction
For a variety of reasons competitive rms turn to each other and collaborate
on their R&D strategies. Collaborating enables rms to share costs and
risks, and have access to each others technology, markets and products.
Together with their partners rms can exploit economies of scale in the
generation and distribution of R&D, benet from the synergy e¤ects from
exchanging and sharing complementary know-how.
Despite its potential benets, there is considerable evidence that inter-
rm collaboration often carries a high risk of failure and has a short life-span.
Kogut (1989), in a study of joint ventures in the United States, nds that
54% were terminated within the rst seven years. He observes that the
signicant number of terminations of joint ventures in their early years sug-
gests that many of these terminations are a result of business failure.1 A
more recent study by Arthur Andersen (Alliance Analyst, 1996) nds that
30% of alliances were reported as outright failuresand another 27% were
unsatisfactory. More recently, Dyer and Powell (2002) study the govern-
ment funded research joint ventures and identify key determinants of success
from interviews with both government project managers (from the Advanced
Technology Program (ATP)) and representatives of companies participating
in 18 joint venture R&D projects on manufacturing technologies of special
relevance to the automobile industry. They nd that one of the main factors
detracting from the projects success is the cost of coordinating the ventures
R&D activities which is found to increase with the consortium size. They
note that several interviewees cited the problem associated with having too
many participants2 and then suggest that there may be a maximum number
of companies that can e¤ectively coordinate on R&D project.
The coordination costs problem may arise from the interdependence of
1Harrigan (1985) nds that almost 50% of alliances end in failure.
2For example, one strong opinion cited:
When we joined the ATP program we didnt realize there would be so many partici-
pants. From my perspective, there were just too many. First, it took so long getting to
know everyone. In addition, scheduling meetings was a nightmare; we had to schedule
meetings a year in advance. It was just too di¢ cult to coordinate.... I would never get
involved in such a large one again.(Dyer and Powell (2002)).
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tasks assigned to partners within an alliance (Gulati and Singh (1998)). The
higher the interdependence, the greater the information they must possess
while the alliance is in progress. The high level of interdependence is of-
ten seen in technology alliances where partners aim to share complementary
technology, jointly reducing the time needed for innovation, or joint develop-
ment of new technology. All these alliances require ongoing inputs from all
partners and constant updating of R&D information.3 This generally signals
high coordination costs. Nonetheless inter-organizational trust may mitigate
problems associated with high coordination costs.4 Firms that trust each
other tend to have a greater awareness, or a willingness to become aware
of the rules, routines, and procedures that each follows. All these factors
dictate the level of di¢ culty in inter-rm coordination, and thus determine
how costly the various R&D tasks can be.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been very little theoretical work
on modeling explicitly the cost associated with forming or running an RJV.
Most standard multi-stage models assume implicitly that launching such
cooperation is costless (for example, Katz (1986), Kamien et al. (1992),
Poyago-Theotoky (1995)). This means that the cost of monitoring R&D
inputs and outputs, contracting and management or the expense of ensuring
a high standard of coordination have been largely neglected.
Katz (1986) and Poyago-Theotoky (1995) allow RJV size to range from
two members to industry-wide, but only one RJV to be formed in their
oligopolistic framework. With the absence of coordination costs, Katz (1986)
shows that even though the industry-wide cooperative agreement which sup-
ports complete information sharing causes a fall in e¤ective R&D as rms
tend to free-ride on each others R&D, welfare always increases through cost
saving owing to the rise in R&D e¢ ciency. We show that this result may no
longer hold when coordinating R&D activities within the RJV is costly.
3The coordination costs issue might get more serious when the technological ex-
change/sharing process among alliance members takes place bilaterally. R&D experts
and scientists from the member rm who come up with an innovation may have to tour
around to train or supervise R&D technicians of other member rms one at a time.
4Trust typically results from prior interactions; rms might have developed together
routines that help easing joint interactions such as exchange of information between them.
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Poyago-Theotoky (1995) shows that for any level of involuntary spillovers
among all rms in the industry, an RJV-rm always generates more R&D
investment than a non-RJV rm in the case where the coordination costs are
absent, as the RJV members benet from full information and cost sharing.
The member rms nd that there exists a critical size of the RJV beyond
which their individual prot will fall, because the benet of information and
cost sharing the standing members get from the admission of a newcomer
is outweighed by the negative e¤ect arising from competing with relatively
tougher competitors in the product market. In contrast, we show that once
the coordination costs determines a rms marginal cost of R&D, the RJV-
rms may not invest more than outsiders or the independent rm under
R&D competition when the coordination costs are relatively high.
Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000) were the rst to incorporate explicitly
the cost arising from forming an RJV. However, their analysis is limited to
duopolistic competition and the cost of forming an RJV is viewed as xed
and does not depend on the scale of R&D output achieved. As a result, the
issues regarding the size of research joint ventures and the costs which can
vary according to the R&D activities undertaken were naturally left out.
We aim to partially ll this gap in the literature by asking how the
coordination costs of operating the RJV a¤ect its performance (e.g., the
members equilibrium R&D, quantities, and prots) and to what extent an
RJV is still preferable when compared to independent R&D competition.
Since coordination costs tend to increase with the size of the research joint
venture, we postulate that the marginal cost of R&D increases with the
number of participants in the venture.
We nd that the presence of coordination costs not only decreases each
RJV rms prot but alters a rms expectation of the benet it would get
from being a member of the RJV. Initially we consider a general functional
form for the coordination costs. For a given size of the RJV, its members
decrease their own R&D as the anticipated coordination costs increase. This
results in lower output and prots. On the contrary, the non-RJV rms
increase their R&D investments in response to the fall in the RJV rms
R&D. The latter supply greater quantities to the market and prot more.
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We show that the performance of the RJV in terms of R&D investment,
prot and welfare in relation to R&D competition is sensitive to the level of
coordination costs.
Next, we choose an appropriate functional form for the coordination
costs, so that a more detailed investigation of their e¤ects on rmsinvest-
ment strategies can be carried out. We show that, although the RJV as a
whole may no longer conduct a unit of R&D at a lower cost compared to the
independent rm under the non-cooperative R&D regime, its members can
still make savings on their own R&D expense through information sharing.
We then address the question of how this drawback a¤ects both the equilib-
rium size of the RJV (which is determined privately by the RJV members)
and the socially optimal RJV size (which maximizes the societal welfare).
We show that not only the equilibrium size becomes smaller as the burden of
coordination costs gets larger, but the discrepancy between the equilibrium
and the optimal sizes is wider as the coordination costs problem becomes
more serious. One important message from our analysis is that by ignor-
ing the coordination costs of operating the RJV, the anticipated benets or
success of the cooperative project could have been grossly exaggerated.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the R&D compe-
tition regime in the oligopolistic framework. The model of a research joint
venture with general coordination costs is formalized in section 3. Section
4 compares the two R&D regimes. In section 5 we investigate the e¤ects
of RJV expansion and look into the issue of the equilibrium size and opti-
mal size of the RJV. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in section 6.
Proofs of the various propositions appear in the Appendix.
2 R&D Competition
In this section we discuss briey the standard model of R&D competition in
an oligopolistic environment.5 There are n identical rms selling a homoge-
nous product in a market with linear inverse demand P = A Pni=1 qi;where
P; A and qi denote price, market size and rm is output respectively. Con-
5See also Katz (1986), Kamien et al. (1992), and Suzumura (1992).
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sumer surplus is CS(Q) = Q
2
2 ; where Q =
Pn
i=1 qi: To avoid unnecessary
complications, we assume that intellectual property rights are well protected,
so that rms cannot free ride on each others R&D outputs (i.e.there are no
R&D spillovers between rms). There are no xed costs and rm is mar-
ginal cost of production (ci), can be reduced by the amount of its e¤ective
R&D output, which, in the absence of R&D cooperation, is equal to the
rms own R&D investment (xi). Hence, rm is unit cost of production
is ci = c   xi; where c is a base cost (i.e. if the rm undertakes no R&D)
and 0 < c < A: The R&D cost function takes the form: Ri = 
x2i
2 ; where
Ri denotes rm i s R&D cost and (> 0) captures R&D e¢ ciency. This
function exhibits diminishing returns in R&D.
We consider a two-stage game. Firms make decisions independently and
simultaneously on R&D outputs in the rst stage, taking each othersR&D
decisions as given. They then compete in quantity in the second stage, on
the basis of the marginal production costs from the previous stage. We use
the subgame perfect equilibrium concept, solving the game backwards.
In the second stage, each rm chooses its output to maximize prots,
yielding equilibrium output for rm i of
qi =
A  nci +
Pn
i6=j cj
n+ 1
(1)
with the associated equilibrium price, p =
A+
Pn
j cj
n+1 , and equilibrium prots
i = [q

i ]
2 : (2)
Substituting for unit costs expression (2) can be written as i =
h
K+nxi X i)
n+1
i2
;
where X i =
Pn
i6=j xj and K  A   c > 0 measures the e¤ectivemarket
size.
In the rst stage, each rm chooses R&D output to maximize second
stage prot net of R&D costs, i.e.
max
xi
i = max
xi
"
(K + nxi  X i
n+ 1
2
  x
2
i
2
#
:
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The rst order condition, provides rm is investment best-response func-
tion:
xi =
K  X i
(n+ 1)   n:
where   = 0 ; 0 =
2n
n+1 , and we assume that  > 0 (i.e.   > 1).
6 Note
that R&D outputs are strategic substitutes, since an increase in X i reduces
the equilibrium product price, and consequently the marginal protability
of xi. Thus, rm is incentive to invest decreases.
Since all rms are identical, we consider a symmetric equilibrium whose
solutions are shown in Table 1. It is easily checked that as the industry
expands, each rm invests less in R&D,7 as its prospective prot decreases.
However, total R&D is not adversely a¤ected.8 There are two distinctive
incentives for a rm to invest in R&D in this model. Firstly, to reduce its
own cost of production and secondly, to create a cost gap between itself and
its rivals. Since there are no knowledge spillovers, the rms R&D output
will not benet other rms, the second incentive works e¤ectively.
Table 1: The R&D competition equilibrium
Variable Symbol Equilibrium Value
R&D bx K(n+1)  1
Firm output bq  bx
Firm prot bv   h   nn+1i [bx]2
Consumer surplus dCS 12 [n ]2 [bx]2
Welfare cW nbv +dCS
3 Research Joint Venture (RJV)
When rms cooperate and form a research joint venture (RJV), we assume
that they enter into a full information sharing agreement, and are successful
6The corresponding second order condition requires that  > 2n
2
(n+1)2
:
7 dbx
dn
=   2K(n+1)(n 1)
[(n+1)2 2n]2 < 0:
8 d(nbx)
dn
= 4nK[(n+1) n]
[(n+1)2 2n]2 > 0:
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in preventing any leakage of information to outsiders.9 Owing to diminishing
returns in R&D, it is optimal for each member rm to keep its research lab
open, and to communicate its discoveries to the other members.10 As a
consequence, the e¤ective R&D output of a member of the RJV is the sum
of R&D outputs achieved by all the members. However, keeping several labs
working in parallel can involve signicant coordination and management
costs if duplication is to be avoided.
Suppose that an RJV exists with k members, 1 6 k 6 n, leaving n   k
independent rms. Within the RJV (i 2 R), information is fully shared.
Unit costs of independent rms(i 2 N) are reduced only by their individual
R&D investments: Consequently, rm is unit cost of production is
ci =

c XR i 2 R
c  xi i 2 N
where XR is the total R&D output of the RJV. We capture R&D coordina-
tion costs by writing the R&D cost function of a typical member as
Ri = g(k)
x2i
2
; where g(k) > 0; g0(k) > 0; g(1) = ; i 2 R
The more members in the RJV, the higher the cost of any given level of
R&D for each member.11
The output stage is exactly as described in the previous section, rms
compete independently on quantity. At the R&D stage, the RJV acts as
a centralized decision maker for its member rms, so there are e¤ectively
n   k + 1 players at this stage. To minimize the cost from producing its
total R&D output (XR); the RJV will choose a uniform level of R&D output
across members (i.e. xi = xr =
XR
k for all i 2 R): The second stage unit
production cost of each member is then cr = c  kxr: The RJV objective is
9Poyago-Theotoky (1999) nds that rms will choose to fully disclose their information
in the cooperative R&D equilibrium. Her conclusion lends support to the assumption
made by a number of papers on RJVs with exogenous spillovers, for example Kamien et
al. (1992).
10See argument supporting this claim in Beath et al. (1998).
11A single rm is an RJV of one member, hence the assumption that g(1) = :
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to maximize the prot net of R&D cost of a representative member,
max
xr
r = max
xr
[K + k(n  k + 1)xr  XN ]2
(n+ 1)2
  g(k)x
2
r
2
where XN =
P
j2N xj is the total R&D output by independent rms. From
the rst order condition, we obtain the best-response function of the repre-
sentative RJV member,
xr =
K  XN
k[(n+ 1)G(k)  (n  k + 1)]
where G(k) = g(k)1(k) ; 1(k) =
2k2(n k+1)
n+1 , and we assume
12 that G(k) > 1:
An independent rm j chooses its R&D output, xj , to maximize its own
prots net of R&D costs
max
xj
j = max
xj
h
K + nxj  
P
i2N; i6=j xi   k2xr
i
(n+ 1)2
2
   x
2
j
2
:
Using the rst-order condition13 yields the best-response function for rm
j,
xj =
K  Pi2N; i6=j xi   k2xr
(n+ 1)   n :
:
Since all independent rms are identical, in a symmetric solution xj =
xi = xn where i; j 2 N: Using this symmetry, the representative RJV-
member rm and outsider rm best-response functions are as follows
xr =
K   (n  k)xn
k[(n+ 1)G(k)  (n  k + 1)] ; (3)
xn =
K   k2xr
(n+ 1)   (k + 1) : (4)
Since both these functions have negative slopes, R&D is a strategic sub-
stitute. An increase in the RJV rmR&D will lead to a fall in the marginal
12Given that G(k) > 1 the relevant s.o.c. is ssatised.
13Given that   > 1 the associated s.o.c. is satised.
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Figure 1: The best-response functions of the RJV and non-RJV rms
benet from a unit of investment of the independent rm, and vice versa.
Solving (3) and (4)we obtain the equilibrium R&D outputs
xr =
[   1]K
k
(k)
(xr)
xn =
[G(k)  1]K

(k)
(xn)
where 
(k) = [(n+ 1)   (k + 1)][G(k)  1] + k[   1] > 0:
In Figure 1, ar and br represent the xr and xn-intercepts of xr(xn) re-
spectively
ar  K
k[(n+ 1)G(k)  (n  k + 1)] ; br 
K
n  k ;
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while an and bn represent the xn and xr-intercepts of xn(xr) respectively
an  K
(n+ 1)   (k + 1) ; bn 
K
k2
:
Equilibrium A in Figure 1 illustrates the unique interior and stable so-
lution where both RJV members and outsider rms invest in R&D.14 For
this equilibrium to hold, we require that coordination costs are su¢ ciently
high. Specically, we require (i) that ar < bn for which a su¢ cient condi-
tion, since ar is decreasing in g(k) and is therefore largest when g(k) = ,
is  > 1(k); and (ii) an < br, for which  > 0 is su¢ cient. Observing that
1(k) =
k2(n k+1)
n 0 > 0, a su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium with
both types of rm R&D active is that  > 1(k):
15
The corresponding equilibrium values are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: The RJV Equilibrium
Variable Symbol Equilibrium Value Sign @@g(k)
RJV-Member R&D xr
[  1]
k
K

(k) -
Outsider R&D xn [G(k)  1] K
(k) +
Member Output qr kG(k)xr -
Outsider Output qn  xn +
Member Prot vr G(k)k2
h
G(k)  n k+1n+1
i
[xr ]
2 -
Outsider Prot vn  
h
   nn+1
i
[xn]
2 +
Consumer Surplus CS [kq

r+(n k)qn]2
2 -
Welfare W  kvr + (n  k)vn + CS -
How do coordination costs16 a¤ect these equilibria values for a given size
of the RJV? In the last column of Table 2, we report the comparative statics
obtained.17 These shed some light on how accounting for coordination
14The stability conditions for an RJV-rm and an outsider rm require G(k) >
k(n k)+n
k(n+1)
and   > k
2+k+1
n+1
respectively. Both are imposed on our analysis:
15Note that 1(k) reaches its maximum when k =
2
3
(n + 1): Thus  > [ 2
3
]3[n + 1]2 is
su¢ cient for an interior solution for all k.
16Coordination costs may vary due toa variety of reasons, such as, changes in commu-
nication systems, routines or rules of information exchange among partners.
17Full derivations available from the authors upon request.
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costs alters the equilibria values relative to the case where there are no
coordination costs. Notice that by simply setting g(k) =  we revisit a
special case of Poyago-Theotoky (1995) when there are no spillovers from
the RJV to outsiders.18 The divergence of results obtained in our model of
costly RJV from those in the conventional RJV model, where coordination
costs are absent, can be clearly seen from the comparative statics.
4 Comparing R&D regimes
In this section we provide a comparison of the R&D regimes in terms of
R&D output, quantities, prots and welfare.
Proposition 1 Given  > 1(k) > 0;  > 1 and G(k) > 1, there exist
critical values for the coordination costs, g1; g2 and g3 where g1 < g3 < g2,
such that R&D output is ranked as follows:
(i)xr > bx > xn if g(k) < g1
(ii)bx > xr > xn if g1 < g(k) < g3
(iii) bx > xn > xr if g3 < g(k) < g2
(iv) xn > bx > xr if g2 < g(k):
These critical values are given by g1  AB1(k); g2  1(k) , g3  1(k)

  1
k + 1

,
and A = (  1)[(n+1)  1 k2]+k[(n+1)   (k+1)] , B = k[(n+1)  
(k + 1)]; A > B:
When there are no coordination costs, g(k) = ; so that  < g1 <
g3 < g2, hence xr > bx > xn . However, as Proposition 1 shows, when
RJV coordination costs are taken into account the relevant rankings can
change substantially. The RJV- rms R&D may fall dramatically to a level
below that of R&D competition if the coordination costs are su¢ ciently high
(parts (iii) and (iv) of proposition).19 The intuition is that, although the
RJV rms benet from an agreement to completely share information and
18 In Poyago-Theotoky (1995), the spillover rate among independent rms and between
the RJV and outsiders varies between zero and one. However, we relate our results to her
special case of no spillovers.
19For example, with linear coordination costs it can be easily shown that g1 < g3 <
k < g2; so bx > xn > xr .
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share the cost of conducting R&D equally among them, there are also extra
costs. These extra costs reect the expenses of conducting a transparent
and e¤ective transmission of R&D information among member rms and
ensuring no duplication of research. For a given size of the RJV, the presence
of coordination costs reduces the marginal protability of the RJVs R&D,
hence reduces the incentive of an RJV rm to conduct R&D. To put it
di¤erently, the positive e¤ect of information sharing on each member rms
incentive to invest is counteracted by the negative impact of higher marginal
cost of R&D due to the research coordination costs, coupled with the e¤ect
of internalization due to joint prot maximization. As a result, the RJVs
investment is lower when there are coordination costs involved compared to
the case of no coordination costs. And when these costs are su¢ ciently high,
the marginal cost of research is relatively large, the RJV rms R&D falls
below that under the R&D competition regime.
An outsider rm realizes that when the RJV is costly to operate, ceteris
paribus, an RJV-rm reduces its R&D as a result of a decrease in its mar-
ginal protability (compared to that when there exist no coordination costs).
Since R&D is a strategic substitutes for both sets of rms, the outsider rm
will then increase its R&D when it sees the reduction in the RJV-rms
R&D. Depending on the size of the coordination costs, if they are su¢ -
ciently high, the outsider rms R&D can overtake that of the independent
rm under the non-cooperative regime.
Our model of coordination costs provides results very di¤erent from
the standard literature, such as Kamien et al.(1992) and Poyago-Theotoky
(1995). First, these authors nd that a rm does more R&D under the R&D
cooperative regime (sharing information and cost) compared with R&D com-
petition because of the joint prots maximization and the information shar-
ing agreement. In contrast, we show that once with coordination costs each
RJV-rm is better o¤ conducting less R&D compared to the R&D compe-
tition regime if these coordination cost is high. Secondly, Poyago-Theotoky
(1995) illustrates that when there are no coordination costs, RJV-rms al-
ways produce larger R&D output than the non-RJV rms. Whereas in
our model, each RJV rm may invest less than its non-RJV counterparts
14
depending on the size of the coordination costs.
Next, we consider the level of coordination costs at which both types
of rms, RJV-members and outsiders, have the same sales in equilibrium.
This will only occur if both have identical production costs at the second
(quantity) stage, which requires that kxr = xn from the rst. From the
solutions in Table 2 this only occurs if   = G(k): Substituting we nd the
corresponding coordination cost function is
dg(k) = k2(n  k + 1)
n
 = 1(k)  = g2:
Further, with this cost function20, qr = qn = bq, the common rm output
in the R&D competition equilibrium. This implies that outsider-rm R&D
output and prots are as in the R&D competition equilibrium, as are total
industry sales and therefore consumer surplus. But the RJV members are
able to take advantage of their sharing of R&D output, so that xr =
xn
k and,
despite the coordination costs, members prots exceed those of outsiders,
vr =  [  
n  k + 1
n
][x]2   [   n+ 1
n
][x]2 = vn = bv:
This implies that total industry prots, and therefore total welfare, ex-
ceeds that in the R&D competition regime. Combining this with the com-
parative static results from Table 2 and the results in Table 1, we summarize
these ndings in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 Given  > 1(k) > 0;  > 1 and G(k) > 1, there exists a
critical value of coordination costs g2 = 1(k) ; such that:
(i) If g(k) = g2: (1) both RJV-members and outsider rms have the same
sales as in the R&D competition equilibrium, qr = qn = bq ; (2) total sales and
hence consumer surplus are as in the R&D competition equilibrium,CS =dCS ; (3) outsiders R&D output is as in the R&D competition equilibrium,
but total member rm R&D output is equal to that of a single rm in the
R&D competition equilibrium; (4) outsider rm prots equal those in the
20Note that dg(1) =  and dg(n) = n, but dg(k) reaches a maximum at \g( 2(n+1)
3
) =
4

n+1
3
3
:
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R&D competition equilibrium,vn = bv; but member rm prots are higher
than in the R&D competition equilibrium,vr > bv .
(ii) If g(k) > g2 , qn > bq > qr , but total sales and hence consumer surplus
are less than in the R&D competition equilibrium, CS <dCS.
(iii) If g(k) < g2; qr > bq > qn , but total sales and hence consumer surplus
are higher than in the R&D competition equilibrium, CS >dCS.
We then provide a detailed comparison of equilibrium prots.
Proposition 3 Given  > 1(k) > 0;  > 1 and G(k) > 1, there exist crit-
ical values of coordination costs: g2; g4 and g5; where g2 < g5 < g4 such that:
(i) r > b > n if g(k) < g2;
(ii) r > n > b if g2 < g(k) < g5;
(iii) n > r > b if g5 < g(k) < g4;
(iv)n > b > r if g4 < g(k):
With coordination costs, the RJV rms invest less than they would have
done if there were no coordination costs, hence they experience lower total
cost reduction, and consequently supply less output to the market and make
less prots (i.e. d

r
dg(k) < 0). Also, a unit of R&D is more costly when there
are coordination costs. On the contrary, the non-RJV rms benet more.
This is because they take into account the fact that the RJV rms would
reduce their investments and supply less, which means that the non-RJV
rmsprospective market shares are then higher. As a result, the non-RJV
rms invest more, supply more and hence gain higher prot when running
the RJV is costly compared to when there are no coordination costs (i.e.
dn
dg(k) > 0).
When maximizing joint prots, the RJV rms take into consideration all
possible costs arising from the production of R&D and consequently each of
them restricts the amount of R&D conducted on its own, and relies more
on the information sharing option with other members. If the coordination
costs are not too high, the RJV rm still benets from being a member of
the RJV, as its prot is still higher than its non-RJV rivals and that of the
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independent rm under the non-cooperative regime. For example, when the
coordination costs are linear in k (i.e. g(k) = k); the result r > b > n still
holds. As for the non RJV rm, the increase in its investment in response to
the reduction in the RJV rmsR&D raises its total reduction in marginal
cost, and thus, its quantity supplied and prot21. If the coordination costs
are su¢ ciently large, the non-RJV rms prot can be even higher than that
of the RJV rm.
Finally, we provide a brief welfare comparison across regimes.
Proposition 4 Given  > 1(k) > 0;  > 1 and G(k) > 1, there exists a
critical value of coordination costs g6 such that W  T cW if g(k) S g6:
Simulations22 show that g2 < g6 < g5:In the case of no coordination
costs, i.e. g(k) = ; since  < g2 < g6; it implies that W  > cW ; the
RJV regime always benets society more than R&D competition. This
result rea¢ rms that of Katz (1986). When coordination costs are present,
W  > cW does not hold always. Recall that dW dg(k) < 0; welfare decreases in
the coordination costs. This is largely attributed to the fall in the consumer
surplus. When coordination costs become too large,W  < cW ; this happens
for g(k) > g6:
5 E¤ects of RJV expansion on equilibrium and op-
timal RJV size
In this section, we address the issue of coordination costs that change purely
due to the variation in a number of participants of the RJV and explore how
the equilibrium and optimal size of RJV vary in response. Provided that
a rms prot is higher if it is a member of the RJV, no rm would want
to be left out as an outsider of the alliance, thus if a current non-RJV rm
21Unlike in Poyago-Theotoky (1995), we assume no spillovers of R&D in this study,
the non-RJV rms will not benet at all from a formation of RJV. The increase in the
non-RJV rms prot comes from the rise in its investment to substitute for the fall in
the RJV rms R&D.
22The simulation results (Mathematica) are available from the authors upon request.
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is allowed to join the existing RJV, it would denitely do so. However, we
assume that the current members of the RJV are concerned only with their
own prots and they, and only they, have power to decide whether or not
to invite any more rms to join the agreement. In other words, the existing
members of the RJV have the right to block a rm that wishes to join in if
such RJV expansion would result in a fall of the existing members prot.
Thus, we dene equilibrium size of RJV as follows.
Denition. The equilibrium size of an RJV, ke; is such that the rep-
resentative members rst-stage prot (i.e. production prot net of R&D
expenditure) is maximized. Thus ke must satisfy the following conditions:
(i) r(ke) > r(ke 1); (ii) r(ke+1) < r(ke); and (iii) r(ke) > n(ke 1):
This ke indicates the number of participants in RJV that makes the
RJV stable. Conditions (i) and (ii) are required so that the existing members
agree not to let another rm join the RJV23, while condition (iii) guarantees
that no member rm wants to drop out as the prot it would get if it were
to leave the RJV is lower. Technically, by setting d

r
dk = 0, we nd the
equilibrium size of the RJV.
Next we dene the optimal size of RJV simply as the size that
would generate the maximum social surplus.The optimal size of RJV, kopt;
is found by setting dW

dk = 0: However, due to computational complexity, a
closed form solution for ke and kopt cannot be found, hence we have resorted
to extensive numerical simulations (see further down).
To simplify the analysis, from now on, we use an explicit functional form
for g(k) which shows increasing marginal cost of R&D as the RJV expands
in size. In particular, let,
g(k) = k for k > 1 and  > 0:
A rms total cost of R&D is then k
x2i
2 : Let
eX denote the total R&D
investment of the RJV, hence the production marginal cost of each member
rm is c   eX: The prot maximizing process of the RJV tells us that each
23This equilibrium concept coincides with the exclusive membership rule discussed in
Yi and Shin (2000).
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member rm is assigned to produce an identical amount of R&D output,
so each rm invests; xi =
eX
k : The R&D cost of each member rm, Rr, is
k 2( eX)2
2 ; while the total R&D cost of the RJV, RRJV ; is:
P
i2RJV
kx2i
2 =
k 1( eX)2
2 : Observe that
dRr
dk 7 0 if and only if  7 2; and
dRRJV
dk 7 0 if and
only if  7 1:
Table 3 shows the R&D expense incurred by each RJV member and
by the RJV as a whole from producing eX units of R&D in three di¤erent
scenarios: (1) no coordination costs ( = 0); (2) when coordination costs are
linear in k ( = 1); (3) when coordination costs are quadratic in k ( = 2):
Table 3: R&D Costs
 = 0  = 1  = 2
Ri =
k 2 eX2
2
 eX2
2k2
 eX2
2k
 eX2
2
RRJV =
k 1 eX2
2
 eX
2k
 eX2
2
k eX2
2
An independent rm producing R&D output of eX; must pay  eX22 : Com-
paring 
eX2
2 with RRJV ( = 0), we nd that the RJV with no coordination
costs is more e¢ cient at conducting R&D than a single independent rm,
in other words, the RJV can produce a unit of R&D output at a lower cost.
Also, an increase in k; for a given eX; reduces the RJVs total cost of R&D.
When the RJV is operating with no coordination costs, the ability to share
information among members brings about the e¢ ciency in conducting R&D,
such that the RJV has R&D cost advantage over the independent rm.
Now the natural question to ask is when coordination costs are formalized
in the model, can the costly RJV maintain such research cost advantage?
We compare 
eX2
2 with RRJV ( = 1), and nd that the RJV is no longer
more e¢ cient compared to the independent rm; in addition, an admission
of a new member has no e¤ect at all on the total cost of R&D incurred to the
RJV. However, the cost of R&D to each member rm (when  = 1) is smaller
if the RJV expands, owing to benets of the information and cost sharing
within the RJV. Alternatively, if  = 2; the RJV becomes less e¢ cient in
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terms of research cost compared to the single rm; the coordination costs
are perceived as a big burden to the RJV such that the RJV has R&D cost
disadvantage compared to the independent rm.
The case of  = 1 (i.e. the coordination costs are linear in k) is an
interesting borderline case; this is because the admission of one more rm
into the RJV will not make the RJV as a whole more cost e¢ cient than
the independent rm, but does make R&D cheaper from each members
viewpoint.
To return to the question of the equilibrium and optimal size of the
RJV, given the use of simulations, we have to choose an appropriate range
of  for the function of the coordination costs, k: Since the RJV is no
longer more cost e¢ cient compared to the independent rm when  > 1;
and simulations show that the rms incentive to form an RJV may not
exist for very high coordination cost ( > 1:2); as the prot of the non-RJV
overtakes that of the member rm, we nd it sensible to concentrate on the
case where  varies between 0 and 1. The cases presented in Table 4 are
for  = 0; 0:25; 0:5; 0:75 and 1. The chosen size of the industry, n; is from
3 to 30: Also, we x  at 285 throughout as it su¢ ces for a positive and
stable solution in the R&D game (i.e.  > 8(n+1)
2
27 ); and K = 0.5 is chosen
to facilitate the simulations as it is an intermediate value between 0 and 1.
Note that for a given size of the industry, the equilibrium and the optimal
size of the RJV are rounded to the nearest integer in Table 4.
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Table 4: Equilibrium versus Optimal Size of RJV
n  = 0  = 0:5  = 0:75  = 1
3 ke 2 3 3 3
kopt 3 3 3 3
5 ke 3 3 3 3
kopt 5 5 4 4
8 ke 5 5 4 4
kopt 7 7 7 7
10 ke 6 5 5 5
kopt 9 8 8 8
15 ke 8 7 7 6
kopt 12 12 12 12
20 ke 11 9 9 8
kopt 16 16 16 16
30 ke 16 14 12 11
kopt 21 23 23 23
The results of the simulations suggest the following: Unless the size of
the industry is very small (i.e. n = 3), the equilibrium size of the RJV, ke;
is less than industry-wide. And as the burden of coordination costs becomes
more serious, i.e. as  increases, the equilibrium size gets smaller. As for
the optimal size, for given n and ; the optimal size; kopt is larger than the
equilibrium size, ke: As  increases the optimal size declines (this result is
more apparent when n is not too small).
What is the reason behind this? A small expansion of the RJV from
its smallest size (i.e. k = 2), causes declines in the RJV and non-RJV
rmsR&D but the benet arising from sharing information still outweighs
the impact of the fall in R&D output conducted by both types of rms.
However, there exists a size of RJV beyond which the negative impact of
coordination costs which results in a large decline in the R&D output of
the RJV-rms o¤sets the benet from sharing information. The overall
result is the fall in the total output supplied. Hence consumers benet less
from a relatively large RJV as product price increases. This response of
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the consumer surplus to the RJV expansion has a large inuence on social
welfare which determines the optimal size of the RJV.
Figure 2 shows what happens to the ratio k
e
n as coordination costs in-
crease.24 Observe that for a given ; k
e
n tends to be smaller as the industry
increases in size. The reason for the rapid fall in k
e
n when the existing indus-
try is not too large is that as the industry is not yet too competitive, each
rms market share is relatively large, the marginal gain from preventing
an increase in the number of tougher competitors (through the RJV) is sig-
nicant. Whereas in the case of very large industry, the rms operate in a
very competitive environment, each possesses a small fraction of the market
and the marginal gain from preventing additional tougher competitors is
not that signicant. Hence, k
e
n is not dramatically decreased as the industry
expands further. We also observe that for a given size of the industry, as
 increases, k
e
n falls. In other words, the proportion of rms forming the
RJV declines as coordination costs exacerbate. This result is not surprising:
higher coordination costs (resulting from the rise in ) skim down the RJV
rms prots.
24We use the actual solutions to the rms prot maximization and the governments
welfare maximization problems to calculate k
e
n
and k
e
kop
: Using the integers (when the
actual solutions are rounded to the nearest integers) for the equilibrium and the optimal
sizes can give us some non-monotonicity in k
e
n
and k
e
kop
:
22
Figure 2: RJV equilibrium size relative to industry size (ke=n)
Figure 3 shows the pattern of the ratio k
e
kop for a given : It indicates
that the equilibrium size is always smaller than the optimal size. When there
are no coordination costs, we nd that k
e
kop can get closer to 1 as the industry
becomes larger. Recall that the rms market share and its protability fall
as the industry expands and becomes more competitive. As a result, each
rm invests less. The standing members of the RJV are then willing to
accept more members in order to benet from higher total cost reduction
(through sharing) and to steal market share from the non-members. While
society may be more reluctant to welcome a larger RJV since it takes into
account the adverse e¤ect the formation of the RJV has on the non-member
rmsprots. Thus, when the industry expands the equilibrium size of the
RJV may increase at a faster rate compared to that of the optimal size.
Consequently, the gap between the equilibrium and the optimal size gets
smaller.
On the other hand, gure 3 shows that when the coordination costs
are present, the ratio k
e
kop falls continually as the industry expands. The
coordination costs have more impact in limiting the equilibrium size of the
RJV than the optimal size. This is because the non-RJV rms prot is
usually higher in the case of coordination costs compared to its prot when
the coordination costs are absent, and that alleviates the negative impact of
the coordination costs on the social welfare. Hence we observe the decline
in k
e
kop as the industry expands.
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Figure 3: RJV equilibrium size relative to optimal size (ke=kopt)
Moreover, gure 3 illustrates that for a given industry size, the discrep-
ancy between the optimal and equilibrium size is wider as the coordination
costs problem increases. This larger discrepancy implies that an R&D policy
might be more called for to support the formation of a joint venture when
coordination costs are high.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we hope to have made a contribution to the literature by ad-
dressing one important drawback of running an RJV, namely, the potential
coordination costs associated with its running. In our model, these coordi-
nation costs were embodied in the cost e¢ ciency parameter of the R&D cost
function; the larger the RJV, the costlier a unit of R&D output. We have es-
tablished that increasing coordination costs reduce RJV-members incentive
to invest, so that the RJV could supply less to the market and prot less.
Also, unlike in the special case of Poyago-Theotoky (1995) where coordina-
tion costs did not exist, here the e¤ect of the coordination costs might su¢ ce
to bring the equilibrium R&D of the RJV-rm to a level below the R&D
competition equilibrium level and below that of the non-RJV counterpart.
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On the contrary, non-members increase their own R&D in response to a fall
in the RJV rmsR&D, thus they supply more to the market and prot
more. However, the increase in the non-membersquantities is not enough
to compensate for the fall in the RJV-rmsoutputs, as a result, consumer
surplus falls. Although the total industry prot could rise as the non-RJV
rms now prot more, this is not su¢ cient to compensate for the fall in the
consumer surplus. The overall e¤ect is thus a decline in social welfare. It is
then possible that the R&D competition regime is socially preferable to the
RJV regime, when coordination costs are su¢ ciently high.
In the second part of the analysis, we have used an explicit functional
form for the coordination costs, i.e. g(k) = k; with 0 <  < 1, to concen-
trate more on the increase in the coordination costs which arose purely from
an increase in size of the RJV. We showed that the burden the coordination
costs could be so signicant that although the RJV-rms still benet from
the information sharing agreement between partners, the RJV as a whole
no longer conducts cheaper R&D compared to the independent rms under
R&D competition. Further, coordination costs a¤ect dramatically the equi-
librium and optimal sizes of the RJV. We no longer obtain the traditional
result that the optimal size is equal to the number of rms operating in the
industry; also, as coordination costs increase the equilibrium size decreases,
as expected.
Our analysis on coordination costs highlights the observation that per-
haps the real gain in terms of prot and welfare from R&D cooperative ven-
tures might have been exaggerated. In an environment where institutions or
organizational designs were not exible, were unsupportive to the ideas of
coordination and information exchange, the R&D competition regime could
easily outperform the RJV.
However, a word of caution is needed in interpreting our results broadly.
The model used has its limitations in the sense that it dealt with a homoge-
nous product, a linear demand, and more importantly it allowed for only
one RJV to be formed. In an alternative scenario where there could be more
than one RJV, the members of one joint venture would realize that other
rms can group in competing joint ventures. The equilibrium size of these
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RJVs might be larger than when only one RJV is allowed to form, as the
potential RJV members would have to take into account the competitive
e¤ect of the competing joint ventures, thus, may want to reduce the size of
the rival ventures. In e¤ect, the RJV members may be more willing to tol-
erate the higher coordination costs arising from allowing more members as
long as the reduction in their production marginal costs are still signicant.
We leave this issue for future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Using the equilibrium values from Tables 1 and 2, we have:
(a) xr ? bx =) (  1)k
(k) ? 1(n+1)  1 : After some manipulation we
obtain, xr ? bx =) AB1(k)  g1 ? g (k) , where A = (   1)[(n+ 1)   1 
k2] + k[(n+ 1)   (k + 1)] and B = k[(n+ 1)   (k + 1)]; A > B;
(b) xn ? bx =) [G(k) 1]
(k) ? 1(n+1)  1 : This reduces to xn ? bx =)
G(k) ?   =) g(k) ? 1(k)   g2;
(c) xn ? xr =) [G(k)   1] ? (  1)k . This is equivalent to xn ?
xr =) G(k) ?   1k + 1 =) g(k) ? 1(k)

  1
k + 1
  g3:
It is easy to check that g2 > g3 and g3 > g1: Combining this together
with (a), (b) and (c) completes the proof.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Using the expressions for rm prot from Tables 1 and 2 and having
substituted for  ; 0; G(k) and 1(k) into these we obtain:
(a) r   b =
=
2K2(n+ 1)2
	2
2
 (n+ 1)I(g(k))2 + k2(n  k + 1)J(g(k))  k4(n  k + 1)2L
where
I  n(n + 1)[(n + 1)43(n   2k + 2)   2n(n + 1)22(n(n + 4)   2k(n +
1)  k2 + 5)
+4n2(4 + n(2n  k(k + 2) + 5))  8n3];
J  (n+ 1)64(n  k + 1)  4nk(n+ 1)4(n  k + 2)3
 4n2(n+ 1)22(4  8k + 2n(k   3)(k   1)  3n3(k   1) + n3)
+16n3(n+ 1)(n(n+ 2)  2k(n+ 1) + 2)  16n4(n  k + 1);
L  2[(n+1)4(n k+1)23 2n(n+1)2(n k+1)(n(n k+3)+2)2
+4n2(n+ 1)(n(2n  2k + 3) + 1)  8n4
and 	  (n+ 1)2   2n > 0;
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 = [(n+ 1)2g(k)  2k2(n  k + 1)2][(n+ 1)2   2n(k + 1)]  4nk3(n 
k)(n  k + 1) > 0:
Given our assumptions, after some algebraic manipulations, we nd that
I, J; and L > 0: Observe that the quadratic function f(g(k)) =  (n +
1)I(g(k))2 + k2(n   k + 1)J(g(k))   k4(n   k + 1)2L is concave in g(k),
reaches its maximum when g(k) is positive and is negative when g(k) = 0:
Thus the inequality f(g(k)) > 0; cuts the g(k) axis at:
dg(k)4a = 2k2(n  k + 1)(n+ 1)
 
 J +pJ2   4(n+ 1)IL
 4I
!
dg(k)4b = 2k2(n  k + 1)(n+ 1)
 
 J  pJ2   4(n+ 1)IL
 4I
!
Note that J2 4(n+1)IL > 0: Since I, J and L > 0;dg(k)4a < dg(k)4b: Hence
f(g(k)) > 0 if dg(k)4a < g(k) < dg(k)4b:
It can be shown that

 J+
p
J2 4(n+1)IL
 4I

< 1, so dg(k)4a; is discarded
given g(k) > 1(k): The relevant root is then dg(k)4b .
Let g4  dg(k)4b. It then follows that r T v if g(k) S g4:
(b) b   n = 2k(n+1)2K2[(n+1)2 2n2]	2
2 M(g(k))2 +N(g(k)) +O
where, M   2n(n+ 1)2((n+ 1)2   n(k + 2));
N  2k2(n  k + 1)[(n+ 1)2((n+ 1)2   n(k + 2))+
n(4n(n+ 1)  (n+ 1)2(2(n+ 1)  k)];
O   2k4(n  k + 1)2((n+ 1)2(2(n+ 1)  k)  4n(n+ 1):
Therefore sign [b   n] = sign M(g(k))2 +N(g(k)) +O : It is clear
thatM(g(k))2+N(g(k))+O is concave in g(k) andM(g(k))2+N(g(k))+O =
0 at
dg(k)a = k2(n  k + 1)ndg(k)b = 2k2(n  k + 1)(n+ 1)

(n+ 1)(2(n+ 1)  k)   4n
2((n+ 1)2   n(k + 2))

Consider dg(k)b. Given our assumptions; (n+1)(2(n+1) k) 4n2((n+1)2 n(k+2)) < 1; which
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implies that this root can be discarded. Hence, M(g(k))2 + N(g(k)) + O
T 0 if g(k) S dg(k)a: Notice that dg(k)a is identical to g2 in Proposition 1, so
it follows that b   n T 0 if g(k) S g2:
(c) r   n =  S(g(k))
2+T (g(k)) U

2
;
where, S  2n(n+ 1)2((n+ 2)   2n);
T  2k2(n k+1)[(n+1)2(n+k+1)2 4n(n+1)(k 1) 4n2(n k+1)];
U  4k4(n  k + 1)2((n+ 1)2   2n2):
Given our assumptions, S; T and U > 0:
It is clear that  S(g(k))2 + T (g(k)) U is concave in g(k): Solving this
quadratic equation, r   n = 0 at g(k) =  T
p
T 2 4SU
 2S : Let
dg(k)5a anddg(k)5b denote the two roots:
dg(k)5a =  T +pT 2   4SU 2S ; dg(k)5b =  T  
p
T 2   4SU
 2S :
Consider the square root term, i.e. T 2   4SU ; it can be written as 4k4(n 
k+1)2[(n+1)2(n+k+1)22 4n(n+1)((n+1)2+k(k 2))+4n2(n k+1)2]:
This quadratic function is convex in  and is positive at its minimum (when
 = 2n((n+1)
2+k(k 2))
(n+k+1)2
): So T 2   4SU > 0:It is then clear that dg(k)5a is
negative, given our assumption   > 1, or equivalently,  > 2nn+1 , and thus
discarded: Next, we check dg(k)5b,which can also be written as:
dg(k)5b = 2k2(n  k + 1)(n+ 1)
 
 V  pV 2  X
 4n(n+ 1)((n+ 2)   2n)
!
V  [(n+ 1)2(n+ k + 1)2   4n(n+ 1)(k   1)   4n2(n  k + 1)];
X  8n(n+ 1)2((n+ 2)   2n)((n+ 1)2   2n2):
It can be checked that  V 
p
V 2 X
 4n(n+1)((n+2) 2n) > 1 so that
dg(k)5b is the relevant
root. Let g5   T 
p
T 2 4SU
 2S  dg(k)5b. It follows then that r T n if
g(k) S g5:
Note that it can be shown that g2 < g5 < g4:Combining this together
with (a), (b) and (c) completes the proof.
31
7.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Using the expressions for welfare from Tables 1 and 2 and having
substituted for  ; 0; G(k) and 1(k) into these we obtain:
W   cW =
=
2kK2(n+ 1)2
 2
2
h
 (n+ 1) eD(g(k))2 + k2(n  k + 1) eE(g(k))  k4(n  k + 1)2 eFi
whereeD  n(n+ 1)" 2(n+ 1)43   n(n+ 1)22(8n+ k + 10)
+4n2(n(n+ 6) + k(2n+ 1) + 4))  4n3(k + 2)
#
;
eE 
264 (n+ 1)
6(k + 1)4   2n(n+ 1)4(k(2n+ 5) + n)3
+4n2(n+ 1)2 [(n(n+ 10) + 8)k   n(3n  5)  4] 2
+8n3(n+ 1)((n+ 1)(n+ 4)  (3n+ 5)k)   16n4(n  k + 1)
375 ;
eF   " (n+ 1)4(2(n+ 1)  k)3   4n(n+ 1)2((n+ 1)(3n+ 2)  k(2n+ 1))2
+4n2(n+ 1)(2(n2 + 4n+ 1)  k(n+ 1))  16n4
#
:
Following algebraic manipulations and given our assumptions, eD, eE; andeF > 0: The quadratic function f(g(k)) =  (n + 1) eD(g(k))2 + k2(n   k +
1) eE(g(k))  k4(n  k + 1)2 eF is concave in g(k), reaches its maximum when
g(k) is positive, and is negative when g(k) = 0: Furthermore f(g(k)) > 0;
cuts the g(k) axis at:
dg(k)6a = 2k2(n  k + 1)(n+ 1)
0@  eE +
qeE2   4(n+ 1) eD eF
 4 eD
1A
dg(k)6b = 2k2(n  k + 1)(n+ 1)
0@  eE  
qeE2   4(n+ 1) eD eF
 4 eD
1A
Note that eE2   4(n + 1) eD eF > 0: Since eD, eE and eF > 0; dg(k)6a < dg(k)6b:
So, f(g(k)) > 0 for dg(k)6a < g(k) < dg(k)6b: It can be shown that
  eE+p eE2 4(n+1) eD eF
 4 eD < 1 so that dg(k)6a is discarded given our assumptions.
32
Following a similar procedure, dg(k)6b is found to be the relevant root. Let
g6  dg(k)6b = 2k2(n k+1)(n+1)  eE+p eE2 4(n+1) eD eF4 eD

. It follows then that W  TcW when g(k) S g6.
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